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Idiomatic expressions can be interpreted literally or figuratively. These two meanings are
often processed in parallel or very rapidly, as evidenced by online measures of idiomatic
processing. Because in many cases the figurative meaning cannot be derived from the
component lexical elements and because of the speed with which this meaning is
accessed, it is assumed such meanings are stored in semantic memory. In the present
study, we examined how literal equivalents and intact idiomatic expressions are stored in
memory and whether episodic memory traces interact or interfere with semantic-level
representations and vice versa. To examine age-invariance, younger and older adults
studied lists of idioms and literal equivalents. On a recognition test, some studied items
were presented in the alternative form (e.g., if the idiom was studied, its literal equivalent
was tested). False alarms to these critical items suggested that studying literal equivalents
activates the idiom from which they are derived, presumably due to spreading activation
in lexical/semantic networks, and results in high rates of errors. Importantly, however, the
converse (false alarms to literal equivalents after studying the idiom) were significantly
lower, suggesting an advantage in storage for idioms. The results are consistent with
idiom processing models that suggest obligatory access to figurative meanings and that
this access can also occur indirectly, through literal equivalents.
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FALSE MEMORY FOR IDIOMATIC EXPRESSIONS AND THEIR
LITERAL EQUIVALENTS IN YOUNGER AND OLDER ADULTS
Idioms, such as kick the bucket, are prevalent in everyday speech
and are examples of figurative language. In addition to the figura-
tive meaning, many idioms also have a literal interpretation—in
the example above, to physically kick a pail or bucket.Whereas the
latter is given by the meaning of the component words, the figu-
rative meaning of an idiom cannot always be inferred by the sum
of its component words, but requires prior knowledge that this
particular combination of lexical units conveys a different mean-
ing. Therefore, in order to efficiently access the idiom’s figurative
meaning, this knowledge must have been previously learned and
stored in memory.
LITERAL AND FIGURATIVE MEANINGS IN IDIOM PROCESSING
A central issue in research on idiomatic expressions is to explain
how both literal and figurative meanings are processed. One
way to examine this is to measure the extent to which lit-
eral word meanings are activated during processing. Across
different models, the presumed degree of activation of literal
word meanings varies substantially. For example, the Lexical
Representation Hypothesis (Swinney and Cutler, 1979) assumes
parallel processing of literal and figurative analyses, whereas the
Idiom List Hypothesis (Bobrow and Bell, 1973) assumes no literal
activation occurs, because idioms are stored separately in the lexi-
con as large lexical units. Recently, Rommers et al. (2013) reported
behavioral and electro-physiological data consistent with unitary
representations (cf. Bobrow and Bell, 1973). Specifically, in their
study, Rommers et al. found no evidence of semantic activation of
the literal wordmeanings when the idioms were presented in bias-
ing contexts, suggesting that top-down processes, such as those
given by context and expectancies, might be sufficient to “turn
off” word-level semantic processing.
However, it is important to note that other studies, which
present idioms in isolation, find evidence of literal word-level
processing. As such, some models, like that proposed by Cutting
and Bock (1997), suggest that idioms are stored as units, but that
activation can spread from the idiom to related word meanings of
the composing lexical units that compose the given idiom. Other
hybrid models include the Direct Access Hypothesis (Gibbs,
1980), according to which literal analysis only occurs when figura-
tive analysis fails. Finally, the Configuration Hypothesis (Cacciari
and Tabossi, 1988) suggests that literal analysis is performed on
incoming lexical items until the “idiomatic key” (i.e., the point in
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which the idiom is recognized as such) is encountered, after which
time, only figurative processing occurs. In sum, there is still a lack
of consensus concerning how idioms are processed.
In part as a test of these conflicting hypotheses, a substan-
tial body of literature (e.g., Gibbs et al., 1989; Cacciari and
Glucksberg, 1991; Titone and Connine, 1994a, 1999; Libben and
Titone, 2008) has investigated when and how literal and figu-
rative meanings are accessed and retrieved. This research has
predominantly relied on speeded tasks, such as lexical deci-
sion (Cacciari and Tabossi, 1988), or production tasks (Cutting
and Bock, 1997; Sprenger et al., 2006). In general, there is evi-
dence that the figurative meaning is available immediately or
soon after presentation of the idiom, depending on how strongly
the current context biases interpretation (Cacciari and Tabossi,
1988). Additional studies have examined how speakers under-
stand idioms and the relations between the individual words
and the figurative meaning (e.g., Gibbs et al., 1989; Cacciari
and Glucksberg, 1991; Libben and Titone, 2008). Several stud-
ies suggest that the idiomatic interpretation precedes the literal
interpretation (Ortony et al., 1978; Gibbs, 1980; Cacciari and
Tabossi, 1988). However, although both literal and figurative
meanings are processed, it is difficult to tease these representa-
tions apart, in part because of the speed with which such pro-
cessing occurs (for example, Cacciari and Tabossi, 1988, suggested
that figurative meanings are available approximately 300ms after
presentation for non-transparent idioms and immediately for
predictable idioms). The evidence reviewed above suggests that,
although it is still not clear exactly when and under what con-
ditions figurative and literal meanings are accessed, the figura-
tive meaning does need to be stored in semantic memory to
support rapid and efficient processing of written and spoken
language.
Accessing stored meaning is likely more important for those
idioms in which the figurative meaning cannot be derived from
the component words (e.g., kick the bucket). These items are said
to lack in transparency compared to other idioms, such as bite
your tongue, in which the figurative meaning of “not speaking”
can be derived from the component words. However, even for
the less transparent idioms, accessing a stored meaning for the
complete idiomatic phrase would presumably be less effortful and
more efficient than computing the meaning from the component
words.
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SEMANTIC AND EPISODIC MEMORY
Knowledge about the meaning of words is stored in semantic
memory (e.g., Balota and Coane, 2008); knowledge about idioms
is presumably also stored in this system. Semantic memory is
generally defined as the storehouse of knowledge that includes,
among other things, factual and conceptual knowledge and the
mental lexicon. Retrieval from semantic memory is often assessed
using visual word recognition tasks, such as lexical decision, in
which participants indicate whether a letter string is a word (i.e.,
an entry in the lexicon) or not. Lexical access occurs when a lexi-
cal entry is identified—i.e., the moment when the item’s meaning
becomes available (Balota, 1990). Thus, lexical tasks offer insights
into how information is stored in and retrieved from semantic
memory, as well as how it is organized.
The effects of semantic and associative relatedness are well-
established in word recognition (see McNamara, 2005, for a
review) and memory literatures. A large body of research exam-
ining semantic and associative priming suggests that processing
words stored in the same semantic networks results in changes
in the accessibility or activation of related word nodes, resulting
in faster response latencies and greater accuracy in lexical tasks
such as lexical decision (i.e., word-nonword decisions; e.g., Meyer
and Schvaneveldt, 1971; Neely, 1977) and pronunciation. Thus,
processing an item such as pail will result in the indirect activa-
tion of related items such as water or bucket (e.g., Collins and
Loftus, 1975). Importantly, this activation is assumed to occur
automatically outside of intentional or volitional processes (see
Neely, 1977).
In contrast to semantic memory, episodic memory refers to
the type of memory involved in the retention and retrieval of spe-
cific events or episodes (Tulving, 1972; Szpunar and McDermott,
2008). Typically, episodic memory is tested by assessing partic-
ipants’ ability to correctly identify items studied in a specific
context or list, often requiring discrimination from similar, but
non-studied, foils. Although often conceptualized as separate sys-
tems (e.g., Tulving, 1972), there is evidence that these two stores
interact with one another influencing performance in a variety of
ways (see Balota and Coane, 2008 for a review).
Perhaps the most well-known evidence for semantic and
episodic memories interfering/interacting with one another
comes from research on false memory, more specifically from
studies using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM; Deese,
1959; Roediger and McDermott, 1995) paradigm. In this
paradigm, participants study lists of related items (e.g., bed, rest,
tired, dream) that converge upon a non-presented related critical
item (CI; e.g., sleep). On memory tests, participants falsely recall
or recognize the CI. These false memories are robust and per-
sist in the face of warnings or instructions to adopt conservative
response strategies (Gallo, 2010). According to the activation-
monitoring account (Roediger et al., 2001a), false memories
occur because converging activation in semantic networks from
the list items to the CI increases the activation or accessibility of
the CI. At retrieval, participants misattribute the source of this
increased accessibility to the episodic study event. Importantly,
this activation occurs automatically when as few as three or six
list items are processed (Marsh et al., 2004; Coane and McBride,
2006; Coane et al., 2007) and the effects are quite persistent in
direct memory tests (Meade et al., 2007).
Additional evidence for the influence of schematic or semantic
processing in episodic memory tests comes from studies such as
Jenkins (1974; see also Bransford and Franks, 1971). Here, par-
ticipants studied sentences such as “the girl broke the window”
and “the girl lives next door.” On a memory test, participants
erroneously endorsed sentences like “the girl who lives next door
broke the window,” suggesting participants were relying on the
gist or integrative meaning of the studied sentences. Furthermore,
as demonstrated by Sachs (1967), verbatim memory for prose
passages declines rapidly, whereas the meaning or gist persists.
Thus, while associative semantic memory networks allow for effi-
cient processing of linguistic material, this efficiency can come
at the cost of accurate/precise episodic memory. In other words,
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activation of similar or related information in semantic memory
can result in errors in episodic tasks. As an extension, these errors
can be used to draw inferences about the underlying nature of
semantic networks that give rise to these errors.
PROCESSING OF IDIOMS IN SEMANTIC AND EPISODIC MEMORY
Within the context of idiom processing and comprehension,
processes in semantic memory presumably support the stored
figurative interpretation, whereas episodic memory traces might
support prior experiences with a particular idiom. Indeed, the
speed with which figurative meanings are derived in idiom pro-
cessing is consistent with rapid and automatic retrieval of mean-
ing from semantic memory stores (e.g., Neely, 1977; Balota and
Coane, 2008).
In the present study, we examined how episodic and semantic
memory systems interact in the processing of idiomatic expres-
sions. The first assumption we made was that figurative meanings
are stored in semantic memory and activated or accessed when
an idiom is processed. We further assumed that the literal mean-
ings of the component words are stored in associative networks
in semantic memory (e.g., Anderson and Bower, 1973; Collins
and Loftus, 1975). For example, bucket and pail are semantically
related and are, therefore, part of the same associative network.
Here we developed a memory task similar to the ones
described above to examine idiom processing. If literal and figu-
rative meanings of idioms are activated in a somewhat obligatory
fashion (e.g., Westbury and Titone, 2011), then both meanings
should be stored as part of a complex memory trace and undergo
temporary changes in accessibility or activation. Thus, lexical
access of one item, such as bucket should activate its neighbors
in semantic memory, such as pail and vice versa. Borrowing
from the false memory literature, we used false alarms (incor-
rect “old” responses to non-studied items) to measure activation
or accessibility. Participants studied lists of idioms and literal
equivalents (LE; i.e., non-idiomatic phrases that preserve the lit-
eral meaning of or are synonymous with an idiom, such as kick
the pail instead of kick the bucket). On a subsequent memory
test, the critical foils were the idiomatic version of studied lit-
eral equivalents (e.g., kick the pail in the study list and kick the
bucket in the test list) and literal equivalents of studied idioms
(e.g., hold your horses in the study list and hold your ponies in
the test list). The main question was whether studying a literal
equivalent like kick the pail increased the accessibility of kick the
bucket and vice versa because of the relationship between pail
and bucket. If the literal meaning of an idiom is the sum of
the words comprising the idiom, principles of spreading activa-
tion predict that phrases or words with similar meanings would
also be activated and more accessible in semantic memory (e.g.,
Jenkins, 1974; Collins and Loftus, 1975; Neely, 1977). Thus, if
individual words are activating their semantic associates, bucket
and pail should activate one another. Importantly, the indirect
activation of kick the bucket should result in the formation of a
complex memory trace that includes the non-presented figura-
tive sense of the phrase. The critical comparison was between false
alarm rates to idioms when the corresponding LE was studied
and false alarm rates to LEs when the corresponding idiom was
studied.
Equivalent error rates in these two conditions would suggest
that participants encoded and stored the literal meaning or gist,
with little or no influence of the stored figurative meaning. In
other words, to the extent that bucket and pail are related, the two
phrases should be stored similarly in episodicmemory and should
result in comparable false alarm rates. However, if studying kick
the pail activates kick the bucket during encoding through the
shared meaning of the noun phrases, then the figurative meaning
in semantic memorymight also be stored, consistent with notions
that figurative processing is obligatory (e.g., Westbury and Titone,
2011). Thus, errors to kick the bucket when kick the pail is studied
should be higher than errors to kick the pail when kick the bucket
is studied, because of converging episodic and semantic traces.
In addition, if the figurative meaning is accessed automati-
cally during encoding, one might expect fewer errors to kick the
pail after studying kick the bucket, because the figurative meaning
would be stored, perhaps more strongly than the literal mean-
ing or verbatim surface information because of the pre-existing
trace in semantic memory. This would suggest that the idiom
was stored holistically (like a large lexical unit; Swinney and
Cutler, 1979) or as a figurative gist trace (Sachs, 1967). As such,
it might not activate a semantically related phrase that does not
share the figurative meaning. This would be consistent with non-
compositional models (e.g., Bobrow and Bell, 1973; Swinney and
Cutler, 1979; Gibbs, 1980), in that the idiomatic expression is
treatedmuch like a unique lexical entry and the component words
of idiomatic expressions are not processed fully as lexical units.
Such a finding would also be consistent with prior work showing
an advantage for figurative over literal processing (e.g., Ortony
et al., 1978; Gibbs, 1980; Rommers et al., 2013).
Furthermore, as reported by Popiel and McRae (1988), idioms
as a whole vary in the rated familiarity of their literal and fig-
urative meanings. For example, break the ice is fairly commonly
used, and thus familiar, in both senses, whereas pick someone’s
brains was rated as high in figurative meaning and low in literal
meaning. Interestingly, even for the idioms rated highly on both
usages, figurative meanings were generally rated as more familiar
than literal meanings, suggesting that figurative meanings might
be highly accessible, even when LEs are encoded. Thus, it is likely,
for the familiar idioms used in the present study, that the figu-
rative meanings are relatively “easy” to access or activate and the
increased activation would likely influence performance on the
memory task.
In addition to examining whether literal and figurative mean-
ings provide bi-directional access to one another, we examined
whether the effects were age invariant. Language experience is
known to vary with age (e.g., Burke and Shafto, 2008). Compared
to college-aged adults, older adults (i.e., individuals over 60)
have an average of 45–50 years of additional experience in their
native language, which might translate into differential process-
ing of idiomatic expressions. To date, however, relatively lit-
tle work has examined idiom processing in older populations
(but see Westbury and Titone, 2011). Older adults generally
show preservation or improvement in semantic memory tasks
(see Balota et al., 2000) compared to younger adults, although
there is also evidence that aging results in difficulties in lex-
ical retrieval (Burke et al., 1991; Abrams et al., 2007). Older
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adults also tend to have difficulties inhibiting competing or irrel-
evant information (e.g., Hasher and Zacks, 1988) and often rely
heavily on familiarity at the expense of item-specific recollection
(e.g., Tun et al., 1998; Dennis et al., 2007). Therefore, exam-
ining this age group’s performance could offer valuable insight
into how idioms are remembered, how episodic and semantic
traces might affect memory performance, and how age and con-
sequent increases in experience with a language may affect these
processes.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-five college-aged students (Mage = 19.4, SD = 1.2, range
18–21; Meducation = 13.6, SD = 1.49) from a liberal arts college
in the Northeastern United States participated in exchange for $5
or course credit. Thirty-two healthy older adults were recruited
from the surrounding community and were compensated at a
rate of $5/h. Older adults had a mean age of 68.3 years (SD =
5.33) and an average education of 16.3 years (SD = 3.00). Older
adults also completed a battery of cognitive tests, including mea-
sures of working memory (Operation Span task; Unsworth et al.,
2005), vocabulary (Shipley, 1940), executive control (Trails B;
Reitan, 1958), and processing speed (Digit Symbol Substitution
Test, DSST; Wechsler, 1997). Scores on the cognitive battery are
presented in Table 1. The Institutional Review Board at Colby
College approved the study.
MATERIALS
Eighty commonly used idiomatic expressions of the form “Verb+
Noun” phrase were selected (e.g., kick the bucket, hold your horses).
In a pilot study, 20 undergraduate students (who did not partic-
ipate in the experiment) provided familiarity ratings on a scale
of 1 (not at all familiar) to 5 (extremely familiar) to all 80 idioms.
The 60most familiar idioms were selected for the experiment. For
each idiomatic expression (hereafter intact idiom, denoted II), a
modified literal phrase (hereafter literal equivalent, denoted LE)
was created by substituting the noun in the II for another sharing
the same literal meaning (e.g., kick the pail, hold your ponies). This
resulted in 60 LEs, which retained the same literal meaning as the
IIs, but no longer had a figurative meaning (see Appendix for a
full list of stimuli).
The study list consisted of 20 IIs and 20 LEs. The test list
included 60 items, half of which were presented in the same for-
mat (10 II-II and 10 LE-LE). The correct response to these items
was “old.” The other 20 items from the study list constituted the
critical foils and the alternate form was presented at test rela-
tive to the study phase (10 II-LE and 10 LE-II). In addition, 20
(10 II and 10 LE) fillers that had not been presented in either
form were included to provide baseline false alarm rates. The
correct response to the latter two categories was “new.” Items were
counterbalanced across conditions. See Table 2 for examples.
PROCEDURE
Participants were tested individually or in small groups of up
to 4 individuals. Each participant was seated at an individual
computer station. The experiment was administered via E-Prime
software (Schneider et al., 2002). Participants were told they
Table 1 | Cognitive battery scores for older adults.
Measure Mean SD Range
Operation span 18.00 8.34 4–34
Shipley vocabulary 34.64 4.49 20–40
DSST 50.47 8.59 28–76
Trails B 102.59 52.44 34–291
Table 2 | Sample stimuli used in the encoding and retrieval phases of
the experiment.
Study Test Condition Correct response
Kick the bucket Kick the bucket II-II Old (hit)
Bite the dust Bite the dirt II-LE New (critical false alarm)
Hold your ponies Hold your horses LE-II New (critical false alarm)
Bury the ax Bury the ax LE-LE Old (hit)
– Smell a rat Foil II New (filler false alarm)
– Spill the peas Foil LE New (filler false alarm)
II, intact idiom; LE, literal equivalent.
would be studying a list of phrases for an unspecified memory
test. The 40 items in the study list were presented one at a time at a
rate of 4 sec/item with a 500ms inter-stimulus interval. The order
of items was randomized anew for each participant. A 5min unre-
lated filler task (i.e., Sudoku puzzles) was administered between
the encoding phase and the recognition test. The instructions for
the test emphasized that a phrase should be endorsed as studied
only if it had appeared in the exact same form. As an example,
participants were told that if they had studied pet the dog and the
test included caress the dog, the correct answer was “new.” The 60
phrases appeared one at a time in random order. The test phase
was self-paced. After the recognition test, all 60 idioms were pre-
sented (in the intact form) for a familiarity rating, using the same
scale as the pilot study. The entire experiment lasted less than
30min.
RESULTS
The data from eight older and one younger adult were omitted
from analyses because of computer errors or failure to follow
instructions (e.g., pressing the wrong keys). The analyses thus
include data from 24 older and 25 younger adults. In all analyses,
p ≤ 0.01 unless otherwise reported. We first examined the famil-
iarity rating data. Overall, familiarity ratings were high (M = 4.5,
SEM = 0.065), suggesting all participants were familiar with the
idioms. Older adults (M = 4.76, SEM = 0.09) reported being
more familiar with the idioms than younger adults (M = 4.26,
SEM = 0.09), F(1, 47) = 14.86, η2p = 0.24.
Turning to the recognition data, an omnibus 3 × 2 × 2
ANOVA was performed with item type (studied, critical foil,
filler) and phrase type (II, LE) as within subjects factors and age
(younger/older) as a between subjects factor. The main effect of
item type was significant, F(2, 94) = 439.43, η2p = 0.90. All pair-
wise comparisons were significant. IIs were endorsed as old more
than LEs, F(1, 47) = 24.59, η2p = 0.34. The item type by phrase
type interaction was significant, F(2, 94) = 9.38, η2p = 0.17, as was
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Table 3 | Average proportion of “old” responses as a function of age and item type (Standard deviations in parentheses).
Hit rates False alarm rates
II-II LE-LE LE-II II-LE Foil II Foil LE
Young adults 0.71 (0.22) 0.69 (0.21) 0.27 (0.17) 0.12 (0.09) 0.10 (0.08) 0.05 (0.08)
Old adults 0.76 (0.23) 0.77 (0.17) 0.31 (0.19) 0.12 (0.13) 0.18 (0.19) 0.05 (0.07)
Average 0.74 (0.20) 0.72 (0.22) 0.29 (0.18) 0.12 (0.11) 0.14 (0.15) 0.05 (0.07)
the three-way interaction, F(2, 94) = 4.57, p = 0.013, η2p = 0.09.
No other effects were significant, all Fs < 1.0. For the sake of
brevity, we focus on the higher order interaction and report
follow-up analyses for hits and false alarms.
Hit rates were submitted to a 2 (II-II vs. LE-LE) × 2 (age)
mixed ANOVA. The interaction was significant, F(1, 47) = 4.27,
p = 0.044, η2p = 0.08. Younger adults had slightly higher hit rates
to IIs (M = 0.77, SEM = 0.04) than to LEs (M = 0.69, SEM =
0.04), t(24) = 1.94, p = 0.064, whereas older adults had numeri-
cally higher hit rates to LEs (M = 0.76, SEM = 0.04) than intact
items (M = 0.71, SEM = 0.04), p = 0.31. No other effects were
reliable, both Fs< 1.
False alarms were submitted to a 2 (condition at test: intact vs.
LE)× 2 (foil type: critical foil, filler)× 2 (age) mixed ANOVA (see
Table 3). The effect of foil type was significant, F(1, 47) = 46.41,
η2p = 0.50, reflecting higher false alarm rates to critical foils (M =
0.20, SEM = 0.02) than to fillers (M = 0.10, SEM = 0.01). The
effect of condition was significant, F(1, 47) = 37.98, η2p = 0.45,
with IIs (M = 0.22, SEM = 0.02) judged as old more than LEs
(M = 0.08, SEM= 0.01). Importantly, these effects were qualified
by a condition by foil type interaction, F(1,47) = 7.04, η2p = 0.13.
The difference between LE-II foils and intact fillers (0.17) was
almost twice as large as the difference between II-LE foils and
LE fillers (0.09). Thus, studying literal equivalents increased the
accessibility or familiarity of the idioms with which they shared
the literal meaning, whereas IIs did not drive up false alarm rates
to their respective LEs as much. No other effects were significant,
all Fs< 1.7, ps> 0.20.
These results suggest that the figurative meaning of familiar
idioms is activated by phrases that share the literal meaning. The
activation in semantic memory presumably occurred during the
encoding phase, when spreading activation from lexical units in
the LE increased the idiom’s accessibility and resulted in the stor-
age of the figurative meaning. However, when the idiom was
studied, the corresponding LE was less likely to receive as substan-
tial a boost in activation or accessibility, suggesting that idioms are
more likely to be processed figuratively than literally. LEs, how-
ever, are processed via their constituent words and these, due to
spreading activation processes, activate related neighbors, includ-
ing the idiom itself. Thus, the presence of episodic and semantic
traces jointly accessed at encoding for LE-IIs might contribute to
heightened errors.
Idioms, however, presumably are processed figuratively and lit-
erally (e.g., Cacciari and Tabossi, 1988). If idioms were processed
solely figuratively, errors to literal equivalents should be relatively
similar for both critical foils and fillers, in that neither type of item
would have received a boost in accessibility (i.e., kick the bucket
would not affect kick the pail). However, if the idioms were also
stored in their literal form, false alarms to LEs when the related
idiom had been studied should be greater than false alarms to
filler LEs (i.e., kick the bucket should result in some activation of
kick the pail). Consistent with the idea that both literal and figu-
rative meanings were stored during encoding, significantly more
errors were made to II-LE items (M = 0.12, SEM = 0.02) than to
LE fillers (M = 0.05, SEM = 0.01), F(1, 47) = 13.80, η2p = 0.23,
and this effect did not vary with participant age, F < 1.
DISCUSSION
The goal of the present study was to explore how idioms are
processed by examining how they are stored in memory; specif-
ically, whether both literal and figurative meanings are accessed
and retained in a comparable fashion, and the extent to which
semantically similar LEs (e.g., kick the pail) increase the accessi-
bility and/or availability of familiar idioms (e.g., kick the bucket).
Younger and older participants studied lists of idioms and LEs and
then completed a recognition test. Overall, hit rates were high and
false alarms to fillers were low, suggesting participants were able
to discriminate between studied and new items. Consistent with
our hypothesis, relative to filler idioms and LEs, false alarms to
the critical foils were higher, suggesting that prior study of related
items did increase the accessibility or activation of the foils (cf.
Roediger and McDermott, 1995). Critically, however, false alarms
in the LE-II condition were significantly higher than those in the
II-LE condition, suggesting that LEs provide access to the idiom
more than the converse. Errors in the LE-II condition may reflect
the activation of the figurative meaning during encoding: study-
ing kick the pail increased the activation or accessibility of kick
the bucket. Furthermore, II-LE errors exceeded errors to filler
LEs, suggesting that studying kick the bucket did increase mem-
ory errors to kick the pail, presumably because of the shared literal
meaning. This finding converges with previous evidence suggest-
ing that idioms are processed and stored figuratively and literally
(e.g., Cutting and Bock, 1997).
These results are also consistent with theories that propose that
both literal and figurative meanings are activated (e.g., Cacciari
and Tabossi, 1988), at least when there is no biasing context
(cf. Rommers et al., 2013). This activation persists for at least
several minutes, directly influencing the accessibility of phrases—
both idioms and Les—that share literal meanings. The fact that
both critical conditions (LE-II and II-LE) resulted in increased
errors relative to the fillers suggests that the individual words,
even in familiar idioms, are stored and processed for their lit-
eral meaning. As noted in the Introduction, equivalent rates of
false alarms to LE-II and II-LE foils would have supported the
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idea that all phrases are stored literally and the basic gist was pre-
served; thus, foils that preserved the meaning of the idiomatic
phrase (for example, the meaning of “kicking a pail or bucket”)
would be equally likely to be falsely recognized (cf. Sachs, 1967).
However, errors in the two conditions were not equivalent; errors
in the LE-II condition were significantly higher than those in the
II-LE condition, suggesting that accessing the figurative mean-
ing of idiomatic expressions occurs in an obligatory fashion, not
only when the idiom itself is studied, but also when a LE is pro-
cessed. This is consistent with a spreading activation account,
whereby activation at the lexical level of individual units or words
activates related neighbors including the component words of
the idiom itself. In other words, studying kick the pail activated
kick the bucket, and the latter appears to have become part of
the episodic trace. Thus, lexical access in semantic networks,
as a result of spreading activation, resulted in the formation of
episodic memory traces, which in turn resulted in memory errors
on a recognition test. Such a finding is consistent with hybrid
views of idiom processing, according to which both literal and
figurative processing occurs.
Literal equivalents increased the accessibility of idiomatic
expression and vice versa. However, simple spreading activation
at the lexical level cannot solely explain the critical difference
between LE-II and II-LE foils, because the activation was presum-
ably bi-directional between LEs and IIs. If lexical level activation
were the only factor, as noted above, equivalent errors would have
been observed in both conditions. What we are suggesting is that
the activation in semantic networks resulted in the indirect activa-
tion of the figurative meaning, and this was stored, with the literal
meaning, and resulted in the inflated false alarms.
However, it is important to note that associative strength is a
critical factor in determining the spread of activation in seman-
tic networks (e.g., Roediger et al., 2001b). The critical constraint
in selecting the nouns for LEs was to select items that preserved,
as much as possible, the meaning of the literal interpretation of
the idiom. Thus, we primarily selected synonyms, where possible,
or items that shared features (e.g., grasp-grip for the idiom get a
grip or bull-cow for the idiom have a cow). Pairwise cosine values
from the Latent Semantic Analysis database (LSA; Landauer and
Dumais, 1997) were calculated to assess the similarity. Briefly, LSA
cosines are a measure of semantic similarity obtained by com-
paring the usage and frequency of pairs of items across a large
database. Higher cosine values reflect more similarity, where sim-
ilarity captures factors such as occurrence in similar contexts. The
average LSA cosine for the items used in the present study was
0.41, which indicates a fairly high level of similarity.
To ensure that the difference in false alarm rates was not
due to differences in associative strength between LE-II items
and II-LE items, bidirectional (from the LE to the idiom and
vice versa) associative strength values between the nouns were
obtained from the University of South Florida Free Association
Norms (Nelson et al., 1998). Values were available for 54 of the
60 pairs of items. The mean associative strength from the LE
noun to the idiom noun was significantly higher (M = 0.16,
SD = 0.24) than the opposite direction (M = 0.09, SD = 0.16),
t(53) = 2.10, p = 0.04. In additional analyses, the five pairs with
the largest difference in associative strength were removed. This
resulted in a set of items with matched associative strength: an
average of 0.11 (SD = 0.17) for the LE to idiom direction and
0.10 (SD = 0.17) for the idiom to LE direction, t < 1. Using only
this subset of items, the ANOVA comparing critical foil and non-
studied foil false alarms was conducted. Importantly, the 2-way
interaction between condition and foil type remained signifi-
cant, F(1, 47) = 5.03, p = 0.03, η2p = 0.10. This confirms that the
higher rate of false alarms to idioms from studying LEs relative to
the false alarms to LEs after studying idioms was not driven by a
handful of items that were strongly associated. For hit rates, anal-
yses on the matched set of items revealed a marginally significant
interaction, F(1, 47) = 3.84, p = 0.056, η2p = 0.076, similar to the
one observed with the full set of stimuli. Thus, the difference
between LE-II and II-LE items was not simply due to differences
in activation of related items.
As noted in the Introduction, reliable memory errors can be
elicited by using a list-learning paradigm. In some studies using
the DRM paradigm, false recognition rates are as high as hit
rates (e.g., Roediger and McDermott, 1995). The false alarm rates
observed in the present study were noticeably lower than those
obtained in DRM studies. Because only one “related” item was
studied (i.e., the paired LE or II, depending on the critical foil
condition) compared to the 12–15 items typically used in DRM
studies, these errors provide further evidence in support of the
powerful role of semantic activation in episodic memory tasks
and demonstrate reliable false memory following study of a single
related item.
An alternative interpretation of the present results is that the
increased false alarms in the LE-II condition relative to the II-LE
condition simply reflected differences in familiarity—in other
words, the effect we observed might be similar to a word fre-
quency mirror effect (e.g., Balota and Neely, 1980; Glanzer and
Adams, 1985), whereby higher frequency items are more likely to
be incorrectly recognized due to higher baseline familiarity lev-
els, whereas lower frequency items are more correctly recognized,
due to their distinctiveness (Joordens and Hockley, 2000; Reder
et al., 2000; Coane et al., 2011). The idioms were more likely to be
familiar compared to the LEs (Popiel and McRae, 1988), suggest-
ing this might be the case. Two lines of evidence argue against
this explanation. First, hit rates overall did not differ between
LEs and idioms; thus, there was no full-blown mirror effect.
Although younger adults had slightly higher hit rates to intact
idioms than to LEs, older adults, who reported having greater
familiarity with the idioms, showed the opposite effect. Moreover,
neither within-group comparison was significant. Thus, familiar-
ity alone was not driving hit rates. Second, although false alarms
to fillers and to critical foils showed the same pattern (i.e., more
false alarms to idioms than LEs), the presence of the interaction
suggests that the stored figurative meaning, accessed during the
study phase, contributed to errors above and beyond the famil-
iarity effects. However, studying an LE did indeed influence the
accessibility of the idiom itself, as reflected by the almost two-fold
increase in errors in the LE-II condition relative to the II-LE con-
dition compared to the difference in errors between filler LEs and
idioms.
Nonetheless, because of the large effects of word frequency in
episodic recognition, we did examine the objective frequency of
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the nouns used in LEs and IIs using the Hyperspace Analog to
Language database (Lund and Burgess, 1996) accessed through
the English Lexicon Project database (Balota et al., 2007). On
average, nouns in the idiomatic expressions had higher estimated
frequency (M = 9.91, SD = 1.48) compared to the nouns used
in the LEs (M = 8.92, SD = 1.64), t(59) = 4.29, p < 0.001. To
ensure that the interaction between foil type and condition was
not driven by baseline differences in word frequency, 13 pairs
of items were omitted from analyses to balance the LEs and
idioms in terms of noun frequency (M = 9.31, SD = 1.45, and
M = 9.66, SD = 1.43, respectively), t(46) = 1.68, p = 0.10. The
ANOVA comparing critical foils and fillers was performed after
removing these items. The interaction between foil type and
condition was marginally significant, F(1, 47) = 3.52, p = 0.067,
η2p = 0.07. Although not significant, possibly due to the reduc-
tion in power, it is important to note that the difference in false
alarm rates between LE-II foils and intact fillers (M = 0.15) was
still about twice the magnitude as the difference between false
alarm rates to II-LE foils and LE fillers (M = 0.076). Thus, even
after removing a subset of items in which the idiom noun was
higher in frequency than the LE noun, the robust increase in
errors in the LE-II condition still remained relative to the II-LE
condition, suggesting that frequency of the component nouns was
not solely driving the effect.
The results might have, in part, reflected a trade-off between
familiarity and distinctiveness. Distinctiveness refers to the extent
to which an item is different relative to other to-be-remembered
items (Hunt and Elliott, 1980) and generally results in enhanced
memory performance. In this context, in which LEs were mixed
with idioms, the LEsmight have appeared distinctive because they
were similar in structure and literal meaning to the idioms, but
were clearly not the intact idiomatic expressions. The LEs in the
present study therefore may have been more distinctive than the
very familiar idioms, and this might have enhanced hit rates and
reduced false alarm rates to these items. Although we cannot rule
this out, the differential rates of false alarms to fillers and crit-
ical items does suggest that studying phrases with shared literal
meanings does affect errors to related items.
Interestingly, the effects of participant age were small. Older
adults reported being more familiar with the idioms, despite the
fact that norming was conducted with college-aged participants.
In the recognition data, there were no consistent age effects.
Because of age-related declines in episodic memory coupled
with relatively preserved semantic memory, as well as age-related
deficits in controlled and inhibitory processes, one might have
expected older adults to show larger effects of the foil type manip-
ulation (i.e., more errors in the LE-II condition due to the spread
of activation from LEs to idioms and deficits in source monitor-
ing). Particularly in light of the strong familiarity older adults
reported for the idioms used here, the relative similarity in per-
formance across age groups is intriguing. There is evidence that
older adults’ memory deficits can be reduced when the to-be-
learned material is more meaningful or relevant (Charles et al.,
2003; Gutchess et al., 2007), thus it is possible that the use of
familiar idioms might have been more engaging for this group
than unrelated word lists. Supporting this interpretation, older
adults had slightly higher hit rates for LEs than idioms, suggesting
that these items may have captured their attention and promoted
deeper processing. For example, older adults might have seen kick
the pail and consciously processed the fact that this is an incorrect
variant of the idiom, thus resulting in a stronger memory trace.
Their familiarity with the idioms might have then encouraged
them to consciously retrieve the “correct” version of the phrase
(i.e., kick the bucket), thereby increasing item-specific processing
for the LEs. However, if this were the case we might have expected
older adults to have higher false alarms to the LE-II items relative
to younger adults due to source monitoring errors that are more
prominent in aging (Hashtroudi et al., 1989; Dywan and Jacoby,
1990). It therefore remains unclear whether the equivalent per-
formance in younger and older adults is due to the fact that the
specific stimuli used here promote additional richness of encod-
ing/additional environmental support (Craik, 1986), or whether
knowledge about idioms is in some way special andmore resistant
to age-related declines than other types of material, though there
is evidence to support the later interpretation. For example, older
adults can recognize metaphors, another form of figurative lan-
guage, as well as, or better than young adults (e.g., Bonnaud et al.,
2002), and a recent study failed to find evidence of age-related
declines in a number of tasks assessing idiom comprehension
(Hung and Nippold, 2014). Such findings suggest that the addi-
tional linguistic experience accumulated by older adults might
support processing of language in general, and figurative language
in particular. Future work, however, is necessary to disentangle
to what extent idiom processing changes over the lifespan and in
what ways.
The present study should be interpreted in light of several
limitations. First, we did not systematically manipulate idiom
decomposability or transparency (the extent to which the figu-
rative meaning can be derived from the constituent words). The
stimuli used included both decomposable idioms (e.g., hold your
horses,miss the boat) and non-decomposable idioms (e.g., bite the
dust, break the ice) according to the norms of Titone and Connine
(1994b). However, decomposability ratings were not available for
more than half of the items used, thus we were not able to examine
whether this factor, as well as other factors like predictability (the
extent to which the final word in an idiom is predictable given
the earlier words), might affect the results. Future work should
manipulate these factors to assess whether there are also differ-
ences in how decomposable and non-decomposable idioms are
remembered.
Second, the present study focused rather narrowly on process-
ing of a specific form of idiomatic expressions (i.e., verb-noun
phrases). However, the results might be of interest to researchers
in other areas of figurative language and pragmatics. Recent work
in this area suggests that, even in figurative language such as
metaphors and irony, theremight be ongoing processing at the lit-
eral level (see Carston, 2010). Briefly, theories such as Relevance
Theory propose that meaning of individual lexical entries can-
not exist out of context and that meaning emerges in each given
communication context where the word appears. In the present
context, this would imply that the meaning of the word bucket is
not “purely” literal or “purely” figurative; rather, the word (as in
a lexical entry in a mental lexicon) might be best thought of
as a “grab bag” of meaning, with the appropriate meaning, as
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determined by the broader linguistic context, being preferentially
accessed and activated (Carston, 2012). In other words, it might
not make sense to consider literal and figurative meanings as
opposite or mutually exclusive, but as elements that contribute to
how language is understood in context. The present results, show-
ing that related noun phrases activate one another, even when one
of them is a “fixed” expression such as an idiom, confirm that
meaning is not fixed, but flexible and dynamic.
CONCLUSION
The paradigm used here differs somewhat from the online mea-
sures used in many studies that carefully track the time course
of idiom processing to assess at what point in processing literal
and figurative meanings are accessed. Here, the use of a delayed
memory test allowed us to use errors as a means of examining
underlying processes. As argued by Roediger (1996) and Schacter
(1999), careful analysis of memory errors can help one under-
stand the underlying organization of the systems that support
memory performance. This logic is evident in research on per-
ceptual illusions (e.g., Rock, 1984) and can be fruitfully applied
to other domains. By examining errors in a memory test, the
present study provides novel evidence for the activation and stor-
age of both literal and figurative meanings of idioms in two age
groups. The results were consistent with models of idiom pro-
cessing that allow for both figurative and literal processing to
occur.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
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